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BOOK REVIEW 
• Mike Hirsch 
Steelworkers Rank and File 
The Political Economy of a Union Reform Movement 
by Phillip W. Nyden 
Phil Nyden has established a reputation as a scholar with a deep 
personal commitment to the prospects of a genuine, grass-roots-based 
militant unionism. With a sensitivity too rare among outside 
observers, Nyden tries to draw lessons based on the actual 
experiences of the rank-and-file, in terms of how they understand 
their situation and the strategies they develop. While this book is 
not without its problems, it represents must reading for union 
activists as well as labor educators, researchers and friends of the 
labor movement. 
The book also fills a gap in the political analysis of industrial 
unionism. Too many studies of union politics base their models on 
industrial relations in the auto industry and the internal dynamics 
of the UAW. Only two books have dealt with steelworker politics; 
while required reading [both are out of print] neither is concerned 
with rank-and-file movements. 
Lloyd Ulman's The Government of the Steel Workers' Union (1962) 
is an exhaustive study of the centralization of leadership in the 
International Executive Board; based on secondary sources and 
convention proceedings, it concludes before the 1959 strike. John 
Herling's Right to Challenge (1972) covers the historical period from 
the founding of the Steel Workers Organizing Committee (SWOC) 
to the Emil Narick challenge in 1969. Less analytical than Ulman 
or Nyden, Herling's work remains the standard history of steel union 
politics by presenting a balanced, if somewhat vague, picture of the 
causes of union political upsurges. Nyden's new work is both a 
contribution to and a significant advance over those of Ulman and 
Heling, and more generally contributes to an understanding of union 
and working-class political mobilizations. 
Nyden subtitles his book, "The Political Economy of a Union 
Reform Movement," because of the need to understand "the broad 
social, economic and political factors outside of an organization which 
Mike Hirsch, a production worker at U.S. Steel's Gary Works until laid off 
in 1982, is currently a graduate student at the University of Chicago, where 
he is writing a dissertation on union pohtics and rank-and-file organization. 
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can inhibit or at least influence the development of rank-and-file 
movements." He analyzes the reform hopes of steelworker militants 
and their realistic possibilities in the specific historical contexts of 
post-war industrial boom and centralized union-management 
relations. Diverse business strategies—involving domestic and foreign 
competition, mergers, diversification into non-steel and non-areas, 
industrial areas, investment in new technology, and collaboration or 
conflict with pliable labor leaders—have an effect on labor relations 
and rank-and-file predispositions, shaping the tempo and goals of 
both union tops and local reformers. The ability of organizations to 
draw support from the surrounding community, their capacity to 
organize on a national as well as local level, and their abililty to 
support and pressure their own elected officials is key to long-term 
success. This multi-layered, integrated approach is interwoven with 
a case study of one of the most 
enduring reform organizations— , 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ the Rank and File Caucus of 
* I f f l i ^ ^ ^ ^ M ^ i * ^ USWA Local 1010 at Inland 
Steel—from the founding of 
SWOC to the founding of the 
caucus in the late 1940's to the 
mass layoffs in 1979 and beyond. 
In the mass organizing drives 
of the 1930's, Nyden sees no 
distinction between "the Union" 
and the needs of the rank and 
file. While policy and political 
differences emerged in all the 
CIO affiliates, there was a high 
degree of democracy at every 
level of the union, and a common enemy in an intransigent 
corporation. Business conservatism and the lack of a centralized 
administrative hierarchy made local union participation by rank-and-
file members not just possible, but necessary. By the end of the 1940's 
however, corporate offensives against militants and dissidents and 
corporate toleration of a new breed of responsible labor leaders laid 
the basis for a separation between "ranks" and "leadership." 
Centralized bargaining and decreased shopfloor representation took 
precedence over rank-and-file issues involving local grievances. 
Relatively high wages and steady employment began to replace the 
shopfloor control. 
As Nyden suggests: 
"Without a well-organized rank and file movement at a union-
wide level, the top union leadership was able to centralize 
leadershi] 
a response 
industry, 
pressure 
consolida 
environm 
pulling to 
This cen 
information/ 
Internationa 
to stabilize 1 
term plannir 
peace was 
command w 
ambitious la 
correspondii 
Due in pa: 
1959, disside 
questions. Ii 
union questu 
"The Union' 
high dues, as 
with the lead 
working con 
national soh 
internal unk 
Yet while 
militants, lo 
networks ne 
organization! 
coverage and 
programs to; 
the early Du( 
looking Sadie 
latter for re 
organization, 
around then 
networks an< 
Central to 
has been 1; 
international 
a committed 
wage settlem 
scale down it 
"»?%'l&&r"n &<; f*fc*' - W . T r «-;-*• 
j j J J i l S ^ ^ ^ 
Reviews 121 
Dpment of rank-and-file 
of steelworker militants 
ic historical contexts of 
ed union-management 
\ng domestic and foreign 
on-steel and non-areas, 
gy, and collaboration or 
effect on labor relations 
:he tempo and goals of 
ility of organizations to 
unity, their capacity to 
d, and their abililty to 
ials is key to long-term 
ach is interwoven with 
idy of one of the most 
reform organizations— , 
and File Caucus of 
ocal 1010 at Inland 
»m the founding of 
the founding of the 
the late 1940's to the 
fs in 1979 and beyond, 
lass organizing drives 
30's, Nyden sees no 
between "the Union" 
eeds of the rank and 
J policy and political 
s emerged in all the 
tes, there was a high 
democracy at every 
f in an intransigent 
lack of a centralized 
icipation by rank-and-
f the end of the 1940's 
ts and dissidents and 
ible labor leaders laid 
;
" and "leadership." 
r representation took 
ng local grievances. 
began to replace the 
rement at a union-
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leadership functions. This internal centralization was as much 
a response to extra-organizational influences, e.g., pressure from 
industry, as it was to intra-organizational processes, e.g., 
pressure from International Union leaders seeking to 
consolidate their control. . .The political and economic 
environment in which the union was functioning. . . was 
pulling top leaders away from the rank and file, (p.31) 
This centralization in administrat ion, bargaining and 
information/expertise, which consistently accrued more power to the 
International leadership, was in part the effect of the corporate need 
to stabilize labor relations. In order to engage in any sort of long-
term planning or investment in new machinery, a guarantee of labor 
peace was required. Thus the centralization of administrative 
command was less a function of "bad" or spineless leaders, or of 
ambitious labor politicians than of objective corporate need and 
corresponding pressure on local and national leaders. 
Due in part of the effects of the 116-day national steel strike in 
1959, dissidents shifted their attention from local to national industry 
questions. In particular, issues of union democracy and internal 
union questions gave way to questions about corporate-labor stances. 
"The Union's relation to the Industry" became central, rather than 
high dues, as a metaphor for a general rank-and-file disenchantment 
with the leadership. Thus, increased lack of autonomy on wages and 
working conditions forced the ranks (and many key leaders) to seek 
national solutions to what earlier had appeared only as local or 
internal union problems. 
Yet while unionwide issues were becoming more important for 
militants, local groups were adopting localized strategies. Local 
networks never sufficiently branched out into effective national 
organizations, and political leaders used legal strategies, media 
coverage and "personalilties" rather than well thought-through policy 
programs to attract a following. Nyden applies this criticism to both 
the early Dues Protest Movement and to the more mature, outward-
looking Sadlowski Fight-Back Campaign. He particularly faults the 
latter for reneging on its claim to be more than a campaign 
organization, and for seeking to build an International opposition 
around themselves, rather than opening up leadership to larger 
networks and trusting an emerging generation of leadership. 
Central to Nyden's analysis is the notion that corporate strategy 
has been largely offensive—determined by the vagaries of 
international competition and general liquidity problems, but not by 
a committed labor movement. The industry was willing to pay large 
wage settlements to modernize its physical plant and to, in effect, 
scale down its longer-term reliance on human labor. In contrast, the 
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rank and file has been limited to reacting to corporate initiatives, 
without being in any position to offer an alternative program or to 
significantly expand its base. With a shrinking base among primary 
steel producers, labor leaders have responded by organizing mergers 
with existing unions, and only secondarily through ''organizing the 
unorganized." 
For Nyden, the only solution to the demise of rank-and-file 
movements is the same solution as for the success of unionism in 
general. Because the problems of modern working people 
increasingly come from breakdowns in the economy itself, solutions 
can no longer be found on a company-wide or even industry-wide 
basis. The "intra-organizational strategies" of union mergers and 
membership diversification are internal stop-gap solutions that only 
put off the day of reckoning. Nyden calls for "seeking greater 
cooperation with other organizations having similar political and 
economic interests." Much of this coalition-building is already going 
on, involving labor, community and religious organizations around 
plant closings, foreclosures, food-banks, and local electoral 
campaigns. But Nyden's larger point is well taken. Rank-and-file 
movements have based their strategies on defensive struggles in local 
conditions and have not proposed system-wide alternatives or 
strategies to match those of the organizations they have been 
dependent on. Until the last five years, they have not had to. 
Nyden is unabashedly a partisan. He wants to see the success of 
a grass-roots-oriented, outward-looking labor movement that is both 
aggressive and responsive. He thinks the continuing efforts at merger 
and legal strategies that protect entrenched centralized leaderships 
are both short-sighted and doomed to fail. Nyden himself has 
contributed to numerous campaigns of leafletting plant gates and 
manning partisan offices. More participant than observer, he rightly 
comments that in highly charged political milieus, the "objective" 
observer is himself suspect. 
For this writer, Nyden's partisanship is not a problem. Rather it 
doesn't go far enough. To be partisan means to win over (or at least 
neutralize) members of the opposition as well as to defeat the 
opposition's leadership. From a centralized union position, this can 
be done in a variety of ways. But from a rank-and-file perspective 
it means winning them over by first understanding what motivates 
support for what is agreed are conservative, self-defeating strategies. 
Precisely because Nyden focuses on "grass-roots critics of the top 
USWA leadership rather than on the incumbent leadership itself," 
he obviates a whole area of explanation and misses a critical dynamic. 
What is missing is an understanding of the motivations and the 
process of political mobilization of the grassroots supporters of the 
International—the plant walkers/talkers who make up the base of 
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pro-International sentiment and networks. While Nyden's 
macrosocial picture is full and complex, his internal union picture 
is too simple. We are given either an accomodating Internal 
leadership and a restive and assertive rank and file. We have no 
inkling of how or why the Internaional can mobilize local networks 
of rank-and-filers to win elections. Thus while Nyden is sympathetic 
to opposition grass-roots networks, he seems unaware that equally 
compelling grass-roots networks exist in departments, sport teams, 
community and ethnic organizations that attach meaning to and 
derive benefits from relations with the International. Nyden is too 
bright and too close to the situation to write them off as either lacking 
sufficient "consciousness" or as being "bought." But he offers no 
other explanation. They simply do not appear in his model. Yet to 
the degree that progressive rank-and-file movements have not 
touched these bases and have failed to offer an alternative is precisely 
the degree to which the International has maintained its hegemony. 
While not "progressive," these loose networks of pro-International-
sentiment are equally rank-and-file based and are not mobilized 
simply by having their strings pulled in Pittsburgh. 
While objectively a pro-International line may lead to corporate 
collaboration at the expense of the ranks (witness the catastrophe 
of concessions bargaining), at the local level there is no clear 
indication that International supporters are worse fighters of 
corporate chicanery or contract violations than their reform 
opponents. Grievances must still be won, and incompetence or 
corporate chumminess can lead to election defeats even for the most 
entrenched local leaders. To the degree pro-International leaders can 
win, it is often by a combination of red-baiting and appeals to 
experience, combined with a dose of anti-company rhetoric. If they 
can't deliver, they are defeated on the local level, either by genuine 
militants or by other aspiring careerist leaders. 
The five USWA International officers are regionally and (to a lesser 
extent) racially balanced; they command support in their regions. 
While Leon Lynch's election, first from local officer in District 31 
to staff representative and then to national Vice President for Human 
Relations, represented for some observers a cooptation and safe 
institutionalization of rank-and-file civil rights insurgency, it also 
represents a degree of power and inclusion for numerous local 
leaders in his home district. Of the many "Rank and File" leaders 
cited by Nyden who were elected in 1970 as insurgents, most have 
long since made their peace with the International and have become 
instrumental in the development of International policy. Even the 
current divisions in several reform organizations (divisions that make 
reelection hopes problematic) are based on differences over alloca-
tions of power and patronage rather than any principled differences. 
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This brings me to a second problem with Nyden—his imprecision 
about what constitutes a "rank-and-file movement." While he sets 
out to study a specific organization, "a progressive rank-and-file 
insurgency," he goes much farther afield. Most of this book relates 
to another question—the increased differentiation between the ranks 
and International leaderships in general. Despite his interest in 
detailing the organizational environment that both shaped and limited 
such movements as the Sadlowski campaign and the Local 1010 Rank 
and File Caucus, he constantly shuttles between such categories as 
"grassroots workers movement," "reform movement," "autonomist 
organizations," "progressive rank-and-file caucus," and "local 
grassroots networks," as though these were interchangeable. The 
topic is too broad (and the book too short) to allow for this 
imprecision. Either the focus is on the fortunes and problems of a 
model union organization or it is on uneven development in the 
consciousness of rank-and-file leaders. If it is about both, then no 
connection is demonstrated in this book. 
Nyden's book represents a real contribution to a systematic 
understanding of the environment against which reform 
organizations rebel and by which they are shaped and conditioned. 
Unfortunately, at $24.95 for a thin hard-back edition, it may not get 
the distribution it deserves. Readers of Labor Research Review are 
encouraged to take advantage of the discount offer advertised in this 
issue. 
• Steelworkers Rank and File: The Political Economy of a Union Reform 
Movement, is published by Praeger, 1984, 166 pp., $24.95. 
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